Description

Introduction: The Problem of Punishment In this thesis, I attempt a study of the problem of punishment and its available answers. Further, I develop a solution to the problem towards the end (in chapters 4 and 5). The emphasis in the work is given on the act of analyzing different theories of punishment and their plausible application in the practical domains as well. The praxis of these theories also contains general critical remarks on them and the ways in which they are deemed inadequate by appraising counterexamples. Let us now consider the problem. Is it morally justified to punish someone if she/he is responsible for the crime? What gives us the right to punish someone who breaks a law? These two questions form the locus around which this thesis develops. If someone breaks the law, we believe that the person responsible should be punished. However, what is at stake in this moral belief? In a normal scenario where the person has not committed an offense, we would never like that person to go through punishment. In a slightly different way, we need to philosophically justify the difference between those who are law abiders and those who break the law. In other words, it is important to address the question- what is at stake when wrongdoer breaks the law such that she/he is intrinsically or extrinsically termed different than the law abider? Different theories of punishment have different ways of answering the above concern. However, the most important issue we need to comprehend is that, often a theory which looks satisfactory from the outset may invariably run into difficulties once we place some counterexamples before it. The theories may often fail to acknowledge the very definition of punishment. In addition, we think that the state has a right to punish its citizens but upon close scrutiny we find several issues which are open ended. The case in which one breaks the law may not actually require moral accounting. There are instances where legal culpability does not lead to moral.